

Message Text

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USMISSION GENEVA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 6282

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, NATO

SUBJECT: CSCE: UK PAPER ON CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES

VIENNA FOR US DEL MBFR

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

1. UK DEL HAS CIRCULATED A RESOLUTION ON CBM' S WHICH UK WOULD LIKE TO TABLE IN CSCE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN THESE RESUME IN JANUARY. EXPLANATION OF CURRENT UK THINKING ON CBM'S WAS CIRCULATED WITH THE BRITISH RESOLUTION AND TEXTS OF BOTH DOCUMENTS APPEAR BELOW. BRITISH PROPOSE TO DISCUSS THEIR PAPER AT POLADS MEETING WITH CSCE EXPERTS JANUARY 10.

ACTION REQUESTED: ANY SPECIFIC COMMENTS WHICH WASHINGTON MIGHT WISH US TO MAKE ON UK PAPERS AT JANUARY 10 MEETING.

2. BEGIN TEXT:

WESTERN OBJECTIVES.

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1. THE THREE CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES ARE A WESTERN IDEA, AND THEY HAVE SO FAR PAID A USEFUL DIVIDEND. OUR PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN SUPPORTED BY THE NEUTRALS, AND THE RUSSIANS ARE ON THE DEFENSIVE.

2. WE MUST NOW LOOK BEYOND TACTICS, AND CONSIDER WHAT WE CAN HOPE ACHIEVE IN SUBSTANCE. OUR AIM SHOULD BE TO SECURE AGREEMENT TO MEASURES WHICH ARE USEFUL, AND WHICH NEITHER HARM THE MILITARY PREPAREDNESS, OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY NOR DEFENCE CAPACITY OF ANY WESTERN STATE, NOR CUT ACROSS THE ALLIED POSITION IN THE MBFR TALKS.

3. THERE ARE THREE WESTERN PAPERS ON THE TABLE IN GENEVA. MANY OF THE IDEAS IN THE EARLIER BRITISH AND NORWEGIAN PAPERS ARE RESTATED IN THE BELGIAN PAPER OF 7 DECEMBER (CSCE/11/C/10). THIS IS A NATIONAL PAPER AND DOES NOT PURPORT TO REPRESENT AN ALLIED CONSENSUS. BUT IT HAS BEEN WIDELY WELCOMED BY THE NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED. WE BELIEVED THAT COMPLEMENTED IF NECESSARY BY OTHER WESTERN NATIONAL PAPERS, IT SHOULD HELP TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE ON THE WARSAW PACT AND TO PROVIDE US WITH A SATISFACTORY BASIS FOR THE DRAFTING STAGE.

SOVIET ATTITUDE.

4. THE ATTITUDE OF THE RUSSIANS IS SEVERELY RESTRICTIVE. THE SOVIET DELEGATION HAVE SHOWN DEEP MISTRUST OF WESTERN OBJECTIVES IN PROMOTING

DISCUSSION OF THESE MEASURES. IT SEEMS PROBABLE THAT THEIR PRESENT INSTRUCTIONS GIVE THEM LITTLE ROOM FOR MANOEUVRE. THEIR MAIN OBJECTIVES APPEAR TO BE TO LIMIT THE AMOUNT OF SOVIET MILITARY ACTIVITY TO BE INCLUDED IN THE CSMS AND TO LEAVE AS MANY LOOPHOLES AS POSSIBLE. THEY DO NOT WANT THE MEASURES TO APPLY TO MUCH IF ANY SOVIET TERRITORY, AND THEY HAVE ALSO TAKEN MINIMALIST POSITIONS ON THE SIZE OF MANOEUVRES TO BE NOTIFIED AND THE LENGTH OF PRIOR NOTICE TO BE GIVEN.

5. THE SOVIET POSITION MAY BE OPEN TO MODIFICATION IN SOME RESPECTS THE RUSSIANS HAVE HINTED AS MUCH IN GENEVA, AND SUGGESTED INFORMALLY THAT THE SCOPE OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION MIGHT BE INCREASED IF LESS BINDING LANGUAGE WERE CHOSEN. IT IS PROBABLE, HOWEVER, THAT THEY HOPE, BY OFFERING CONCESSIONS ON LENGTH OF NOTICE AND PERHAPS THE STRENGTH OF THE POLITICAL COMMITMENT, TO OBTAIN WESTERN AGREEMENT TO THEIR VERY RESTRICTIVE IDEAS ON THE AREAS OF APPLICATION. CONFIDENTIAL

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6. THE RUSSIANS MAY ALSO BE ANXIOUS NOT TO PREJUDICE THEIR POSITION IN THE MBFR DISCUSSIONS IN VIENNA. IF SO, THEY MAY NOT BE PREPARED TO MOVE SIGNIFICANTLY FROM THEIR POSITION IN GENEVA UNTIL THEY ARE ABLE TO FORM A CLEARER PICTURE OF WHAT WILL EMERGE FROM VIENNA.

WESTERN TACTICS.

7. THE RUSSIANS ARE TRYING TO SET ASIDE THE WESTERN DISCUSSION PAPERS. THEY HAVE PROPOSED INSTEAD AN IMMEDIATE START TO DRAFTING ON THE BASIS OF AN "ANONYMOUS" PAPER OF THE KIND THE SOVIET DELEGATION CIRCULATED DURING THE PREPARATORY TALKS IN HELSINKI, THEY HAVE SUGGESTED THAT THE RELEVANT SUB-COMMITTEE SHOULD BEGIN BY TACKLING SOME, BUT NOT ALL, OF THE MATTERS COVERED BY PARAGRAPH 23 OF THE HELSINKI RECOMMENDATIONS. THEY PRESUMABLY HOPE TO BEGIN

WITH THE EXCHANGE OF OBSERVERS AND GO ON TO THE NOTIFICATIONS OF
MANOEUVRES.

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8. AT PRESENT ANY COMPROMISE DRAFT WOULD HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF
THE SOVIET AND ROMANIAN TEXTS WHICH ARE THE ONLY DRAFT RESOLUTIONS
ON THE TABLE. THESE TEXTS ARE TO INSUBSTANTIAL TO PROVIDE A
SATISFACTORY BASIS FOR DRAFTING, AND THE IDEA OF TACKLING THE EASY
SUBJECTS FIRST IS CLEARLY INTENDED TO HELP THE RUSSIANS AVOID THE
MORE DIFFICULT ONES ALTOGETHER.

9. WE SEE NO REASON FOR MODIFICATION OF THE WESTERN POSITION IN
PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES. AS SET OUT IN THE GELIGIAN PAPER IT IS DESIGNED

TO PROMOTE COMMON SENSE AND PRACTICAL ARRANGEMENTS IN AN AREA WHICH
PROVIDES, IN A WAY UNDERSTANDABLE TO PUBLIC OPINION, A TEST OF THE
GOODWILL OF THE WARSAW PACT AND OF THEIR DESIRE TO PROMOTE CONFIDENCE
IN THEIR MILITARY INTENTIONS. WE SHOULD NOT RELAX OUR PRESSURE. OUR
AIM SHOULD BE TO MAKE THE RUSSIANS RECOGNISE THAT EFFECTIVE
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING ARRANGEMENTS ARE IN THE WESTERN VIEW AN ESSENTIAL
INGREDIENT OF A SUCCESSFUL CONFERENCE. SUCH AN APPROACH IS LIKELY
TO BE VIEWED WITH SYMPATHY BY THE NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED.*

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10. IF WE ARE TO MAINTAIN OUR PRESENT POSITION SUCCESSFULLY, THREE CONDITIONS MUST BE FULFILLED. FIRST A FURTHER EFFORT IS REQUIRED TO RESOLVE THE OUTSTANDING DIFFERENCES IN THE ALLIANCE ON POINTS OF DETAIL. THIS PROCESS COULD BE COMBINED WITH A CONTINUING REVIEW OF THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSITION.

11. SECONDLY WE MUST RETAIN THE INITIATIVE IN GENEVA. THIS MIGHT BEST BE ACHIEVED BY THE URGENT PREPARATION OF A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WHICH COULD BE TABLED AS SOON AS DELEGATIONS IN GENEVA THOUGHT TACTICALLY APPROPRIATE.

12. THIRDLY WE MUST AGREE ON OUR TACTICS ON THE PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS. THE ALLIANCE HAS SO FAR AGREED (CM(73)72) THAT IT WOULD BE TACTICALLY ADVISABLE TO LEAVE IT TO THE RUSSIANS TO SHOOT DOWN ANY REFERENCE TO MOVEMENTS. THIS REMAINS THE BRITISH VIEW. BUT IT IS APPARENT THAT THE RUSSIANS WILL TRY TO AVOID ASSUMING THIS RESPONSIBILITY BY POSTPONING DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION.

THEY ARE ALREADY SUGGESTING THAT THE CONFERENCE SHOULD AGREE TO LANGUAGE INDICATING NO MORE THAN READINESS TO DISCUSS THE NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS IN DUE COURSE (IE AFTER THE CONFERENCE). WE SHOULD RESIST ANY CONCLUSION OF THIS KIND AT THE PRESENT STAGE, NOT LEAST BECAUSE THE POSTPONEMENT OF DIFFICULT QUESTIONS UNTIL ANY UNSPECIFIED DATE AFTER THE CONFERENCE WOULD HAVE UNFORTUNATE IMPLICATIONS (E.G. IN SETTING AN UNDESIRABLE PRECEDENT FOR ITEM III AND FOR FOLLOW UP MACHINERY.)

13. WE SHOULD THEREFORE MAINTAIN A REFERENCE TO MOVEMENTS IN A DRAFT RESOLUTION ON THE LINES SUGGESTED IN PARA 11 ABOVE. IF, LATER, WE HAVE TO DROP IT, WE SHOULD EXPECT CONCESSIONS IN RETURN. THE ALLIANCE WILL NEED TO CONSIDER WHAT THESE CONCESSIONS MIGHT BE.

14. THE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF THE EARLY TABLING OF A COMPREHENSIVE DRAFT RESOLUTION ON CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES CAN BE SUMMARISED AS FOLLOWS:

(A) IT IS CLEAR THAT THE EASTERN INTENTION IS TO RECORD THE RESULTS OF ALL COMMITTEE I DISCUSSIONS IN A SINGLE DECLARATION DOMINATED BY THE SECTION ON PRINCIPLES. IT IS HOWEVER AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN OUR STRATEGY THAT THOSE MILITARY ASPECTS OF SECURITY TO WHOSE DISCUSSION WE ARE ALL COMMITTED SHOULD NOT BE IGNORED OR PRESENTED IN A WAY CONFIDENTIAL

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WHICH WOULD SUGGEST THAT THEY ARE OF SECONDARY IMPORTANCE. WE SHOULD THEREFORE WORK FOR A SEPARATE AND SELF-CONTAINED RESOLUTION ON THIS SUBJECT.

(B) ANY MOVE TO DRAFTING IS LIKELY TO BE PRECEDED BY A PERIOD DURING WHICH THE VARIOUS PROPOSALS MADE IN THE SUB-COMMITTEE WOULD BE BROUGHT TOGETHER. IT WILL BE IMPORTANT THAT THERE IS ON THE TABLE AT LEAST ONE WESTERN DRAFT OF EQUAL STATUS TO THAT TABLED BY THE RUSSIANS.

(C) DRAFTING COULD WELL TAKE PLACE IN AN INFORMAL WORKING GROUP.
IN THAT CASE IT WOULD BE ESSECTIAL FOR THE WEST AND THE NEUTRALS
AND NON-ALIGNED TO HAVE A CLEAR WESTERN TEST FROM WHICH TO NEGOTIATE

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15. THE DRAFTING OF SUCH A TEXT PRESENTS A NUMBER OF PROBLEMS:-
(A) THE NATURE OF THE COMMITMENT. IT IS GENERALLY AGREED THAT THE
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES WILL HAVE TO BE OF A VOLUNTARY RATHER
THAN A MANDATORY NATURE. IT HAS ALSO BEEN SUGGESTED IN NATO AND IN
DISCUSSION IN GENEVA THAT THEY SHULD HAVE A POLITICAL AND MORAL
FORCE RATHER THAN BE OF A LEGALLY BINDING CHARACTER. SINCE, HOWEVER,
IT WOULD BE MORE EMBARRASSING FOR NATO COUNTRIES THAN FOR WARSAW
PACT ONES TO DISREGARD THEIR COMMITMENTS, WE SHALL NEED TO ENSURE
THAT THE STRENGTH OF THE COMMITMENT TAKES ACCOUNT OF THE IMPORTANCE
OF THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES IN QUESTION. THE RUSSIANS HAVE
INDICATED THAT IF THEIR OWN RESTRICTIVE PROPOSALS WERE ACCEPTED,
THEY WOULD BE PREPARED TO CONSIDER A POLITICAL COMMITMENT EXPRESSED
BY THE WORD "WILL". THEY SHOULD BE HELD TO THIS FORM IN A MORE
SUBSTANTIAL TEXT.

(B) OTHER CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. FOR TACTICAL REASONS IT IS
IMPORTANT THAT A WESTERN DRAFT WHOULD NOT APPEAR TO CLOSE THE DOOR
ON MEASURES PROPOSED BY NEUTRAL OR NON-ALIGNED COUNTRES. WE NEED TO
REACH AGREEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE ON WHAT LANGUAGE WE COULD
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ACCEPT TO COVER SUCH ADDITIONAL CBMS. THE BRITISH DELEGATION HOPE TO BE ABLE TO MAKE SUGGESTIONS AT THE MEETING ON 10 JANUARY.

(C) THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE DRAFT RESOLUTION SHOULD COVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF PARAS 22 AND 24 OF THE FINAL RECOMMENDATION. IT IS DIFFICULT TO SAY AT THIS STATE HOW DISCUSSION OF OTHER MILITARY ASPECTS WILL DEVELOP, AND IT WOULD BE USEFUL IF A SEPARATE PAPER ON THIS PROBLEM COULD BE PREPARED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE BUT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE EVEN NOW TO AGREE TO A DRAFT ON CBMS INTO WHICH ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE ON THE OTHER ASPECTS COULD BE INCORPORATED IF THIS PROVES DESIRABLE, WITHOUT AT THIS STAGE RISKING ANTAGONISING THE NEUTRALS BY APPEARING TO PREJUDGE THE ISSUE.

16. A TENTATIVE DRAFT OF SUCH A RESOLUTION IS ATTACHED.

" CONSCIOUS OF THE WIDER OBJECTIVE OF PROMOTING BETTER RELATIONS AMONG THE PARTICIPATING STATES AND OF ENSURING CONDITIONS IN WHICH THEIR PEOPLE CAN LIVE IN PEACE FREE FROM ANY THREAT TO OR ATTEMPT AGAINST THEIR SECURITY:

HAVING IN MIND THE NEED TO REDUCE THE DANGERS OF MILITARY MISUNDERSTANDING AND MISCALCULATION AND THUS TO CONTRIBUTE TO REDUCING THE DANGERS OF MILITARY CONFLICT IN EUROPE:

REAFFIRMING THE NEED TO GIVE EFFECT TO REFRAINING FROM THE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE IN ANY MANNER INCONSISTENT WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
RECOGNISING THAT IN CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES MILITARY MANOEUVRES AND MOVEMENTS CAN GIVE RISE TO FEARS OF A POSSIBLE THREAT OR USE OF FORCE:

CONSIDERING THAT SUCH FEARS WILL NORMALLY ARISE IN A SITUATION WHERE THE PARTICIPATING STATES LACK CLEAR AND TIMELY INDICATIONS OF EACH OTHERS INTENTIONS:

CONVINCED THAT THE PROVISION OF RELEVANT INFORMATION ON AN AGREED BASIS CAN DO MUCH TO CONTRIBUTE TO THEIR OBJECTIVE OF STRENGTHENING CONFIDENCE AND INCREASING STABILITY AND SECURITY:

RECOGNISING ALSO THAT THERE ARE OTHER WAYS IN WHICH INDIVIDUAL STATES CAN CONTRIBUTE TO THIS COMMON OBJECTIVE:
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THE PARTICIPATING STATES

1. WILL GIVE PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MANOEUVRES AND MOVEMENTS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE FOLLOWING PROCEDURES:

(A) NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN APPROXIMATELY 60 DAYS IN ADVANCE OF THE START OF THE MOVEMENT OR MANOEUVRE, OR, IN THE CASE OF MANOEUVRES OR MOVEMENTS ARRANGED AT SHORTER NOTICE, AT THE

EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY:

(B) NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN ON A BILATERAL BASIS TO ALL
OTHER STATES WHO HAVE PARTICIPATED IN THE CSCE:

(C) NOTIFICATION WILL BE GIVEN OF ANY MAJOR MILITARY
MANOEUVRE OR MOVEMENT COMPRISING ACTIVITY, BY THE EQUIVALENT OF
A DIVISION OR MORE OF TROOPS TOGETHER WITH ANY AIR OR NAVAL
COMPONENTS, IN WHICH ANY PARTICIPATING STATE IS INVOLVED OR WHICH
TAKES PLACE WITHIN, ACROSS OR INTO THE TERRITORY OF ANY
PARTICIPATING STATE:

(D) NOTIFICATION WILL INCLUDE THE PROVISION OF INFORMATION
ON THE NAME AND GENERAL DESIGNATION OF THE MANOEUVRE OR MOVEMENT.
THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL INVOLVED AND THE NATURE OF THE UNITS TAKING
PART, THE PURPOSE, THE TIMEFRAME, THE AREA CONCERNED, THE FINAL
POINTS OF DEPARTURE AND DESTINATION OF THE PARTICIPATING UNITS.
THE UNIT DESIGNATION AND THE PERIOD OF ABSENCE OF PARTICIPATING UNITS
FROM THEIR NORMAL DUTY STATION:

II. WILL INVITE EACH OTHER ON A BILATERAL BASIS TO SEND OBSERVERS,
IN A RECIPROCAL AND NON-DISCRIMINATORY MANNER, TO ATTEND AS MANY
AS POSSIBLE OF THE MILITARY MANOEUVRES THAT THEY MAY HOLD OR
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